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Subject Choice and Earnings of UK Graduates
* 
 
Using a survey of a cohort of UK graduates, linked to administrative data on higher education 
participation, this paper investigates the labour market attainment of recent graduates by 
subject of study. We document a large heterogeneity in the mean wages of graduates from 
different subjects and a considerably larger one within subject with individuals with the most 
favourable unobserved characteristics obtaining wages almost twice as large as those with 
the worst. Moreover, gender differences in wages within subjects are also large. We then 
simulate a graduate tax to calculate a willingness to pay – in form of tuition fees – to capture 
these subject wage premia. 
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I Introduction 
The markets for higher education in Europe are quite regulated with little 
freedom for institutions to determine tuition fees, which in general are low and rarely 
differ by subject.  At the same time, the costs of providing programs differ 
substantially
1. The unique tuition price thus creates equity problems, especially when 
students in the costlier programs (receiving the highest subsidies) become graduates 
earning the most
2
                                                 
1 For example, the Higher Education Funding Council for England grants institutions between £15,788, 
and £3,947 (in 2008) per student depending on their subject of study.  
2 It could be argued that subsidies should be based on the social returns to the education provided but 
not on the costs of provision. 
.  Indeed the UK white paper on the future of higher education 
(2003) notes that: “We believe that a revised contribution system should recognise 
these differences [in average returns] properly, and not ask students who can’t expect 
such good prospects in the labour market to subsidise those that can, through a flat 
fee” (DfES, 2003, p88).  Reforms to create a market for higher education, as in 
England, potentially  allow  for  price differentiation  between subjects.  Hence, it is 
timely to report on the wage differentials  by subjects for a recent cohort of UK 
graduates, to assess a willingness to pay for different subjects.  
As demonstrated by Dearden et al. (2008), reforms to the funding of higher 
education have important redistributional effects which differ by gender.  We thus 
investigate whether there are any gender differences in the subject premiums.  Indeed, 
while the overall gender wage gap is small amongst this cohort of recent graduates, 
we report large gender differences in earnings within subjects.  Moreover, if fees are 
allowed to differ by subjects, prospective students need information on the mean 
wages but also on their dispersions. We thus investigate the within subject differences 
in wages using quantile estimators. The issue of wages dispersion within subject has 
so far been largely ignored.     2 
Finally, we compute the life time wage profile of graduates and compute the 
present value of a graduate tax. Assuming that students had perfect forecast on the 
wage profiles this present value would be equivalent to the maximum willingness to 
pay for different subject choices.  These calculations ignore that student may have 
different preferences for subject and thus lead to upper bound estimates of the 
willingness to pay for each subject. 
The literature estimating returns to subject has found large variations. Indeed, 
James et al. (1989) states that in the US wage differentials by major are much larger 
than across institutions.  Previous work for the UK (Bratti et al., 2005, Chevalier et 
al., 2002, Naylor et al., 2002 or Walker and Zhu, 2005) relates to pre-tuition  fee 
cohorts, where subject choice may have been affected by different parameters. For 
example, the consumption value of education may play a lower role in subject choice 
when tuition fees are levied.  The general conclusion is that there is  a  large 
heterogeneity in wages by subjects with health, science and social sciences (mostly 
economics, law and business) graduates earning more than humanities, education and 
arts graduates, the difference reaching about 10%. Walker and Zhu (2010) calculate 
internal rate of returns for different subjects using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and 
report no to low returns to degrees in art, humanities and languages. A similar subject 
ranking is found in France, Germany and the U.S. (Machin and Puhani, 2006).  
In this paper, we rely on evidence from a cohort who paid up-front tuition fees.  
The Longitudinal Destination of Leavers of Higher Education (LDLHE) surveyed a 
sample of graduates from the 2003 cohort representing the universe of British higher 
education institutions
3
                                                 
3 Naylor et al (2002) uses the USR dataset an administrative survey of all UK graduates, 6 months after 
graduation. While this represents the universe of graduates it lacks information on earnings and the 
authors use occupation to infer earnings. This may be problematic if occupations 6 months after 
. Information on their current labour market achievements is   3 
collected by survey in November 2006 three years after graduation. The LDLHE is 
linked to administrative records of the students which include academic attainment 
and family background.  While the data is an improvement on previous graduate 
surveys since it can be linked to administrative data, its drawback, as with most other 
graduate surveys,  is that earnings are only observed at one early point in the 
graduates’ career. 
Specifically, we estimate subject specific wage differentials, for the full sample 
and separately by gender. Due to the lack of credible identification variables we make 
the assumption, as in the literature that subject choice is exogenous
4
                                                                                                                                        
leaving university are a poor proxy for lifelong occupation. In the LDLHE data, only 38% of graduates 
are in the same occupation (at the two digit level) 6 months and 3 years after graduation.  
4 Bratti and Mancini (2003) estimate jointly the subject choice (four broad categories) and earning 
equations, however the estimated returns to subject are unstable, often jumping from one year to the 
next by 10 to 30 percentage points, casting doubts on the identifying strategy. 
. The bias, when 
this assumption is made may be limited when a rich set of controls is available. 
Indeed Arcidiacono (2004) concludes that in the U.S., subject choice is driven by 
individual preferences rather than expected future earnings. Beffy et al (2009) using 
French data, also find limited evidence that variations in wages along the business 
cycle affect subject choice. Hence estimates of subject wage premium may not be 
severely biased even if some unobserved characteristics explain both subject choice 
and earnings. Additionally, we rely on quantile regressions  to  estimate these 
differentials at different points of the residual wage distribution, so as to measure the 
variation in  wages within subject.    If prospective students are unsure about their 
position in the unobserved skill distribution or have a strong risk aversion, they may 
opt for a subject offering lower mean salaries and lower variance.  Finally we use 
these  estimates and data from the LFS  to compute the associate life-time wage 
profiles by subjects – thus assuming that the subject specific wage differentials are 
constant over time - and compute a graduate tax which has the same parameters as the   4 
loan system currently in place. The tuition fees are then the present value of the 
streams of incomes associated with this tax.  
To preview the results, even after accounting for a large set of covariates, we find 
a substantial amount of heterogeneity in wages for this cohort of graduates. Medicine 
and dentistry graduates are clear outliers, earning twice as much as psychology 
graduates (£39,190 vs £19,290), and there is  substantial heterogeneity around the 
average annual earnings of £23,000.  Interestingly, even excluding medics the gap in 
mean wages between subjects is around 0.25 log points but the gap within subject 
(90/10 range) is about 3 times larger. This large variation in wages within subjects 
has previously been largely ignored but potentially affects subject choice. While the 
overall gender wage gap,  at three percent,  is limited there are important wage 
differentials within subjects. For example, male economists earn 17% more than 
female’s while female graduates in education earn 22% more than men.  In term of 
tuition fees, the mean wage premia suggest a range of fees from £1,900 to £5,300. 
However, with large variations in wages within subjects and by gender, it is unclear 
how subject specific tuition fees could be implemented.  
 
II Data  
The LDLHE was conducted in November 2006 amongst a random sample of 
graduates from the academic year 2002/03.  This cohort,  which typically started 
university in September 2000, would have been charged up to £1,100 per year of 
studies
5
                                                 
5 Depending on parental income, about one third of  students were eligible for full tuition fee subsidies 
and another third paid reduced fees. The legislation differ for Scottish students who did not have to pay 
tuition fees. 
. The survey is conducted in two stages. First, the universe of all the leavers 
who were UK domiciled prior to attaining higher education is sampled six months 
after graduation (75% response rate). In the second stage, a random sample of 55,900   5 
of these original respondents is selected to take part in the LDLHE.  The data is 
collected using a mixture of postal, phone and online questionnaires and 24,823 of the 
selected population  participated, giving a  response rate of 44%  which is pretty 
standard for this  survey  methodology, especially when relying on three years old 
contact details.  Furthermore, Tipping and Taylor (2007) provide evidence in favour 
of the representativeness of the survey, and we discuss below how the distribution of 
subject compares in the DHLE and the full population.  
The LDLHE has several advantages over previously used datasets. It contains the 
universe of institutions, precise subject of graduation, several measures of academic 
achievement pre-university and at university as well as labour market information.  It 
can also be linked to administrative data from the Higher Education Statistical 
Agency (HESA) so that accurate information on family background and, pre- and 
university achievements can be included.  Additionally we supplement the dataset 
with measures of the quality of the attended institution.  In the previous literature this 
has mostly been omitted which could have lead to biased estimates of the subject 
premium if, for example, more prestigious institutions are more likely to teach high 
wage subjects. We measure institution quality along  various dimensions including 
research (Research Assessment Exercise score), teaching (pupil/teacher ratio, 
expenditure on students, completion rate) and quality of the student body (average 
entry score), as in the good University Guide
6
                                                 
6The Good University Guide is one of the providers of ranking of universities. Rather than using its 
ranking, we only use the raw variables which can be obtained from: 
..  We use a principal component 
approach to reduce this information into a single score. The first component accounts 
for 71% of the variation and a higher value of the score indicates greater quality. This 
strategy  leads to a ranking of institutions that appears plausible as the top five 
institutions in the country, in alphabetical order, are Cambridge University, Imperial 
http://www.thegooduniversityguide.org.uk.    6 
College  London, London School of Economics, Oxford University and University 
College London.  
The population of interest is limited to first degree holders, currently observed in 
employment.  We further restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 25 on 
graduation, so as to limit the effect of pre-university labour market experience. This 
leads to a sample of 9,296 observations (See Table A1 for details on the sample 
selection). We assess the representativeness of the LDLHE survey by comparing it to 
HESA data on first degree leavers for the year 2002/03
7. The distribution of graduates 
by subjects is reported for the two sources in Table A2. Broadly, the LDLHE is 
consistent with the administrative data but there are some discrepancies between the 
two datasets; the largest being observed for subject allied to medicine and education 
which originates from differences in the coding of mixed subjects
8
First we describe  two  characteristics that  correlate  with  subject  choice  and 
earnings: A-level score and institution quality (see Table 1). The HESA data includes 
the score of the best 3 A-levels (or equivalent) for 90% of the selected sample
.  The final sample 
only contains full-time workers  with valid earning information, which drops the 
number of observations used in the analysis to 7,735. The subject distribution remains 
very similar when conditioning on wage non-response.  
 
III: Descriptive statistics 
9
                                                 
7 The Destination of Leavers Higher Education represents the universe of all UK leavers and is the first 
step survey in the collection of the LDLHE 
8 For example, 50% of graduates from mixed subject with no science are in a teaching occupation three 
years after graduation. 
9 A-levels are the upper high school national examination. It is externally marked. A, B, C, D and E 
grades are worth 10, 8, 6, 4, and 2 points respectively.  A-levels are not required to attend higher 
education, so the missing observations are a mix on non-response and no A-levels. In more recent 
cohorts the tariff score which takes account of all qualifications has been computed, but this is not 
available for this cohort. The subjects in which the A-levels were taken is not available. 
. The 
maximum score is 30. Due to strict selection, graduates from medicine and dentistry   7 
have the highest average test score at 28. The other subjects with high quality intake 
are math, economics, law, philosophy and languages with an average A-level score 
above 22, while graduates in education have the lowest average A-level score at 15.  
Subject choice may also be correlated to the characteristics of the institution. For 
example, experimental sciences are expensive to teach and may be more likely to be 
taught in more prestigious institutions that also generate earning premium (Chevalier, 
2010).  The second column in Table 1 reports the mean institution quality by subject. 
Medicine, economics, mathematics and literature are taught in the highest quality 
institutions.  The difference between  high and low quality score subjects such as 
communication  and sport sciences  reaches almost two standard deviations, 
highlighting the potential bias in estimates of subject premium that do not control for 
institution quality.   
The LDLHE reports annual earnings three years after graduation. We recode 36 
observations with an unusually high salary – compared to their occupation average 
earnings - which were due to coding errors (additional zero) and drop 149 individuals 
who claim to earn less than the national minimum wage (assuming they worked 52 
weeks a year). The third column of Table 1 reports the average annual earnings for 
full-time workers earning less than £60,000 per year. The description by subjects 
reveals the large heterogeneity in earnings. Medics are the clear outliers with average 
earnings of £39,000. The next best paid subjects have  mean  earnings around the 
£25,000 mark, and include  subject allied to medicine, mathematics, engineering, 
architecture and economics.    Subjects with the lowest average earnings  are 
Communication, Linguistic, Creative Arts and Psychology with mean wages between 
£19,000 and £20,000. So even excluding medics, there is a 25% gap in the mean 
earnings of graduates between the worst and better paid subjects.   8 
Figure 1 reports the earnings distribution separately for each subject. There are 
marked differences in the shape of the earnings distribution by subjects. For example, 
education (and mixed no science), and subject allied to medicine are characterised by 
narrow distributions since a large fraction of graduates in these subjects become 
teachers and nurses respectively – occupations mostly found in the public sector that 
have salaries determined on a national pay scale. Most distributions are uni-modal 
with the mode around £20,000; the exceptions are medicine, economics, Finance and 
Accounting which have a much flatter profile than other subjects. 
 
IV Empirical strategy 
The descriptive statistics  have highlighted that earnings differ by subject. 
However, since the characteristics of students largely vary by subject we control for 
these confounding factors in a Mincer log earning specification: 
ε β β β γ β + + + + + = ∑ G X X S Y
j
j j 3 2 2 1 1 0 ln           (1) 
where lnY is the log annual wage, Sj is a dummy variable indicating graduation from 
subject j, so that γj is the estimated mean wage differential for subject j graduates 
compared to physical sciences graduates. X1 and X2 are sets of controls for pre- and 
post- university characteristics respectively. X1 varies with specification but in the 
most extensive model includes ethnicity, age, disability status, parental social class, 
fee status, type of school attended and  A-level score. X2  includes  institution 
characteristics such as class of degree and graduating institution quality (or an 
institution fixed effect), but also labour market experience and job characteristics, 
which may be correlated with subject j and thus be considered endogenous. G is a 
dummy variable defining gender and ε is a random component assumed normally 
distributed capturing all other factors determining earnings. Since the error term may   9 
be correlated between individuals from the same institutions the standard errors are 
clustered at the institution level.  
This model is first estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS). The estimates are 
the mean effects of subject of graduation on earnings, after controlling for 
confounding factors. An extension to this model, includes a set of interaction terms 
between gender (G) and subjects (Sj).  However these  models  only capture mean 
differences and fail to capture the heterogeneity in wages within subject. So (1) is 
also estimated by quantile regression which estimates  the  subject  specific wage 
premiums  at various quantile of the  conditional  wage distribution  (Koenker and 
Bassett, 1978).  The conditional quantiles  can  be interpreted as individual non-
observable characteristics. The quantile regression model can be written as: 
θ θ θ θ θ θ ε β β β γ β + + + + + = ∑ G X X S Y
j
j j 3 2 2 1 1 0 ln     (2) 
which is estimated at the θ
th conditional quantile of lnY. The advantage of quantile 
regressions is that the effect of a given covariate is not assumed to be fixed across the 
distribution, i.e. in our specific application the subject wage premium may vary at 
different points of the income distribution.  As such this analysis would lessen the 
criticism that some unobserved characteristics that influence earnings and choice of 
degree subject may bias the OLS estimates. 
 
V Between subject results 
a- overall between subject wage premiums 
OLS results  are reported in Table 2. The first column report the raw wage 
differentials compared to physical science graduates.  In specification (2) we control 
for local labour market as some subjects may be associated with specific locations. 
For example, graduates from Agricultural studies are more likely to live in rural areas   10 
and would then be expected to have lower wages all else considered. On the other 
hand, location may be considered endogeneous if higher earners can afford to live in 
more desirable  part of the country. To limit this potential endogeneity, we use 
employer’s - not own location - and only a two digit postcode defining 126 labour 
markets.  Comparing results in Column (1) and (2) location indeed matters, the wage 
premiums for some subjects changing by as much as 50% and the R
2 doubling, but no 
clear pattern emerges.  
Medics earn about 60% more than physics students. Another three subjects are 
associated with earning premium over physics that are greater than 10%: subjects 
allied to medicine, architecture and engineering. Three  subjects have substantial 
lower earnings compared to a physics degree; linguistic, communication and creative 
art graduates’ pay is less than 90% of physics graduates’ pay.   Medics are clear 
outliers, but excluding them, the log wage range is still a substantial 0.28 log points 
between the best and worst paid subject. 
In column (3) we control for personal characteristics: gender, age, ethnicity and 
parental social class. Since there is little variation in these characteristics by subjects, 
with the exception of gender,  the estimated coefficients remain relatively stable.   
Adding  secondary education achievements  (Column (4))  reduces  the estimated 
coefficients since there is a positive correlation between A-level score and wages. 
Note however, that after accounting for A-level score, education becomes one of the 
best paid subjects with a premium over physics reaching 9%, since these graduates, 
despite a low A-level score average enjoy relatively high salary early on in their 
career.  In Column (5) we add more personal characteristics which are approximating 
the financial constraints of the students: fee status, accommodation type when 
studying, as well as type of secondary school attended and disability status. These   11 
have little effect on the subject differentials. After accounting for this extended set of 
individual characteristics  the gap between the best paid and worst paid subject, 
excluding medicine, is still 0.25 log points, similar to the raw gap. Graduates from 
subject allied to medicine enjoy the highest mean earnings while those from 
linguistics and classics have the lowest.  
We now control for institutional quality  by  adding  a set of dummies for the 
quality quartile. The impact on the estimates is small and the direction unclear with 
non-science subjects generally gaining. In Column (7) we instead includes institution 
fixed effects to assess whether the small impact made by the inclusion of the quality 
measure was due to the lack of relevance of institution characteristics or a problem 
with the proxy used.  Again the direction of the changes, when comparing to 
specification (5)  is unclear but for some subjects the gains are substantial. For 
example, the average wage for psychology graduate is 7.4 log points lower than for 
physics graduates when omitting institution factors but only 5.4 when including them. 
So analysis that do not account for institution, either by accounting for some measure 
of quality or with a fixed effect model,  are  potentially biased.  In this extensive 
specification the earning gap between subjects is  still  0.26  log points, excluding 
medicine. 
Final grade  is commonly included in wage regressions of graduates  but  is 
potentially endogenous if subjects are not graded to the same standards.  While highly 
significant itself, final grades has  an  effect  on the estimated premium  for  only a 
handful of subjects: Architecture, Language, Finance and Psychology. Thus while 
there are some differences in grading between subjects they do not explain much of 
the subject gap.  Model (9) adds a full set of job and early career characteristics such 
as tenure, contract type, employer’s size, number of jobs and number of months of   12 
unemployment since graduation, current occupation and highest qualification. These 
variables are not independent of subject choice and these estimates are thus presented 
only for completeness. Their inclusion largely reduces the premium for most subjects 
since part of the subject differential originates from occupational choice.  Finally, to 
try to capture the quality of the job-match, model (10) adds a set of dummies on the 
reason to accept the current job. These  variables  depresses the wage differential, 
especially for medicine, subject allied to medicine, architecture and education, thus 
the higher earnings from graduates from these subjects  may  reflect partly some 
compensating differentials. The  larger  drops  in  the  wage premium are  for  health 
related and education subjects which typically lead to careers in the regulated pay 
sector.  In our favoured models (6), (7) and (8), there are still substantial differences 
in wages by subject reaching 0.26 log points between subjects allied to medicine and 
linguistic graduates.  
b- gender specific effects 
We have so far failed to account for potential gender effects in the subject 
specific wages. In Table 3, we thus present results, using specification (6) separately 
by gender
10
                                                 
10 Note that early on in their career, there is no difference in labour force participation by gender, so we 
do not control for participation. 
. As well as the coefficients of the log wage equation, we report for each 
subject the predicted wage for an average individual.  There are large differences in 
predicted wages by gender; in particular for graduates from education (mixed subjects 
without science) and economics where the gaps reach 20 percentage points. Results 
from a pooled regression interacting subject with gender largely confirm these results 
but with more precision. The estimated interactions are reported in column (3) of 
Table 3 and represent the subject specific premiums for men over women assuming 
everything else constant.  Male graduates from the following subjects have   13 
significantly higher earnings than female: Economics (+0.17), law (+0.12), IT 
(+0.09), subjects allied to medicine (+0.08), while female graduates earn significantly 
more than male in the following: Education (+0.22), Mixed subjects without science 
(+0.21), Linguistic (+0.14), History and Philosophy (+0.09) and Mixed subjects with 
a science (+0.09). While early on in the career of these graduates the overall gender 
gap at 3% is small there is a large variation in earnings by gender within subjects. 
Moreover we replicate the exercise using specification (10) above which includes 
amongst others occupation and reasons for choosing current job.  The gender wage 
differentials are then reduced but not eliminated, they thus are not solely due to 
gender differences in occupational choice.  
c- Within subject results 
When choosing a subject, prospective students have imperfect measures of their 
position in the ability distribution (Chevalier et al. 2009) and may thus also consider 
the wage dispersion within subject. We thus re-estimate the log wage equations at 
nine  different quantiles of the earnings distribution  controlling  for  pre-university 
characteristics and institution quality, as in specification (6) of Table 2. In Table 4, 
we report the estimated wage differentials at each quantile compare to a physics 
graduate. The variations in the subject premiums depend on unobserved ability.  For 
example a classic graduate in the 3
rd quantile can expect a 0.01 log point lower wage 
than a physics graduate but at the 9
th quantile, the difference reaches 0.19 log point. 
There is no clear pattern in the earning differentials compare to physics through the 
quantiles, with about half the subjects showing decreasing differentials through the 
quantile and the rest showing no clear trend.  
Figure 2 presents the predicted log wages at different quantiles for a subset of 
subjects. The predicted wages are generally increasing in quantile. At each quantile,   14 
medical graduates earn more than other students, but medics with the worst set of 
unobservable  earn less than graduates  from low-pay subject with  non-observable 
characteristics in the top three quantiles. For example a graduate from psychology at 
the 90
th quantile has a predicted ln wage of 10.18, higher than the earnings of a medic 
at the 10
th quantile (10.09). The ranking of other subjects varies by quantile but some 
pattern emerges. Amongst the subjects reported in Figure 2, arts, psychology and 
biology are always the lowest earning subjects at all quantiles. Finance and Law have 
the steepest profiles. At lower quantiles education offers relatively high wages. This 
is consistent with education professionals being rewarded on a pay scale, i.e. 
independently of the graduate’s  quality,  while finance  and law  professionals are 
largely rewarded according to their own performance.  The point to note from the 
quantile analysis  is that there is  a  considerable amount of variation in predicted 
earnings within subjects. The 90-10 differential in predicted log-wage is reported for 
each subject  in the last column of Table 4. Math, Law, Arts, IT, Economics and 
Finance are subjects with the largest range, reaching 0.80 to 0.97 log points; i.e. 
graduates from the top quantile earn almost twice as much as those from the bottom 
quantile, even after accounting for personal characteristics and academic ability. Even 
in subjects with less variation, the 90-10 differential reaches 0.60. This compares with 
between subject differential which was around 0.25 when excluding medics. So the 
expected wage differential within subject is considerable  larger than between 
subjects. Note that there is no relationship between the median predicted wage and 
the within subject range, even after excluding medics who enjoy the highest earnings 
and one of the  lowest  variation.    Graduates in high variance subjects do not get 
compensated for the risk. 
   15 
VI Discussion 
As more countries,  including the UK are liberalising their market for higher 
education, we now discuss the implication of the wage differential on the willingness 
to pay for degrees in different subjects. Under the funding arrangement in place since 
2006 in England, institutions can charge up to £3,290 students take an interest free 
loan to cover tuition  and  maintenance (up to £5,239 per year in 2011)
11
We do not argue here for the introduction of a graduate tax but only compute it to 
approximate a range of tuition  fees  associated with the subject wage differentials 
previously calculated
.  The 
reimbursement is income contingent at a rate of 9% for each pound above yearly 
gross earnings of £15,000.  After 25 years any remaining debt is cancelled. Such a 
system is progressive especially for women, with 21% expected to not reimburse their 
loan fully; the comparable figure for men is 2% (Dearden et al. (2008)). We use these 
parameters to simulate a graduate tax.   
12
We first compute the earning profile of graduates from different subjects using 
pooled data from the Labour Force Survey (1994-2010) and estimate an equation 
. Excluding the £11,000 of the average loan that occurs from 
living expenses (as in Dearden et al. 2008), the present value of the tax is equivalent 
to an up-front tuition fee. We ignore any effect on demand that differential fees would 
create.  While previous research has indicated that prospective students have 
imperfect knowledge of their future stream of income and that it may not influence 
their subject choice, tuition fee differential would likely make students more aware of 
the financial implications of their choices. 
                                                 
11 Details on the financing available to students can be found from the Student Loan Company (2010). 
For students starting their course after September 08, a 5-year “holiday” period has also been 
introduced which allows graduates to defer any payment for up to 5 years. While all graduates should 
take this option this is not incorporated in the calculation.  An option to repay the loan quicker also 
exists but is not used in the calculations. 
12 For more details on the benefits and drawbacks of a graduate tax see Garcia-Penalosa and Wälde, 
(2000) or Chapman (2006).   16 
similar to specification (2) but also including interactions between subject and 
dummies for age
13
As a starting point, we use the wage profiles of management graduates since this 
a subject which is a popular for both men and women and whose wage profile in the 
DHLE is similar to physics. Starting from the wage profile of management graduates, 
a 25 years long graduate tax is equivalent to a tuition fee of £2,190 (allowing for 
£11,000 of maintenance expenditure and using a discount rate of 3.5%
.  The analysis is done separately by gender to account for 
differences in the wage profile.  Non-working individuals are recoded has having a 
zero wage.  The  resulting wage profiles are  plotted for a selection of subjects in 
Figures 3A and 3B for men and women respectively. For men, up to the age of 50, the 
profiles are reasonably similar between subjects and thus we make the assumption 
that subject wage differential are constant over the life time of graduates. Relying on 
cross sectional data we cannot separate life-cycle effects from cohort effects, so these 
estimates only provide an approximation of the life cycle that current students may 
experience. For women, the wage profiles do vary by subjects. This is partly due to 
changes in the composition of the population of female graduates between cohorts. 
14
                                                 
13 The LFS defines 19 subjects (not exactly as in the LDHLE). The regression does not control for 
parental social class. The age dummies are for 5 year band categories 
14 The current Treasury recommended discount rate is 3.5% (HMT Green Book). We calculate the 
present value at age 18, when young people typically start university. 
.  Since the 
LFS data shows that the subject specific wage differentials are reasonably constant 
over time, we use our estimated range of premium and report (Table5) the implied 
tuition fees for graduates from subjects earning 10% less to 15% more than business 
and administration. Based on the wage differentials calculated, the tax present value 
for different subjects is equivalent to tuition fees in the range from £1,900 to £5,300 
per year.  This compares with the current tuition fees of £3,290. However, it is 
important to note the large differences in implied tuition fees by gender. Due to their   17 
lower participation to the labour market women’s wage profile are much lower and 
flatters than men’s. This has a large impact on the total amount that would be 
collected by a graduate tax. For the average management student, the implied tuition 
fee for women is only 25% of the men’s, this share is even lower for low earning 
subjects. 
The draft higher education regulations (2010) increases the threshold at which 
payments are made to £21,000 and the write off period to 30 years but reduce the 
interest subsidy for graduates with earning above the £21,000 threshold.  It also lifts 
the cap on tuition fees to £9,000 (under wider access conditions). In the second panel, 
we recalculate the implied tuition fees using these parameters. Apart for top- earners, 
this reduces the amount of tax collected as the effect of the higher repayment 
threshold dominates the expansion of the payment period. The implied tuition fee for 
the average management graduate is thus reduced by 45%. With these parameters, the 
implied tuition fees are nil for women, up to those with a wage profile 10% higher 
than the mean management graduate. For men, the fees range from £3,300 to £7,100. 
Since most of the variation in wages is within rather than between subjects, we 
replicate the simulations for graduates at different point of the participation adjusted 
wage distribution.  We assume that a graduate in a given percentile of the earning 
distribution remains at this percentile throughout his live. This lack of mobility under-
estimates  the lower fee band,  especially for women who will experience more 
variation in their positions in the distribution through getting in and out of the labour 
force. Under a 25 years graduate tax, the present value of the tax for the median 
graduate implies fees lower than the current cap, at £2,000, with fees ranging from 0 
to £9,600. Again there is a large amount of variation by gender. Only for graduates in 
the top 75
th percentile of the distribution (90
th for women) is the implied fee in the   18 
range of those recently proposed. Moving to a 30 years repayment system with a 
higher threshold at which repayments start implies reduced tuition fees. 
Those back of the envelope calculations indicate that there is some scope for 
pricing subjects differently. Similarly, Walker and Zhu (2010) compute large 
differences in the internal rate of returns by broad subject categories.  What these 
calculations have also indicated is the large gender variation in implied fees. This is 
due to the lower earning profile for women and their lower participation to the labour 
market. Since tuition fees cannot be differentiated by gender, an average tuition fees 
may have a large impact on the gender balance of subjects. Finally, with the 
parameters used to simulate the tax, only individuals in the top quartile of the earning 
distribution would generate earnings allowing them to repay the tuition fees to be 
introduced for 2012.   
 
VII Conclusions  
We use a cohort of recent graduates to estimate the differences in early labour 
market attainment by subject of graduation. Even after controlling for a large array of 
individual characteristics  which could be correlated to subject choice, a large 
dispersion in subject specific mean wages  remains  (0.26  log  points,  excluding 
medical degrees). To put these differences into context, we compute a graduate tax to 
calculate an implied tuition fee using parameters of the current English loan system. 
These implied tuition fees range from £1,900 to £5,300, but differ largely by gender. 
Indeed a substantial fraction of graduates especially females, would pay lower fees 
than currently.  This fraction becomes larger under a new set of parameters stemming 
from a proposed reform of higher education financing which extend the threshold at 
which payments start and the period of payment.    19 
The calculations presented provide some metric to put into perspectives subject 
wage differentials.  They do not represent differences in the costs of provision of 
education or relative demand, nor should they be taken as evidence to advocate a 
graduate tax, or subject specific fees. Also, we ignore the effect on participation and 
subject choice that such a fee structure may have. Moreover, under the current 
financial system of deferred tuition fees, graduates are insured against poor labour 
market outcomes. Indeed while the reforms aim to foster a market in higher 
education, this insurance isolates graduates with poor prospective outcomes from the 
financial consequences of their choices. In fact, those individuals may become 
indifferent to tuition fees in the knowledge that they will never pay them back fully. 
Finally, subject specific wage premiums are dwarfed by the differences in wages 
within subject. Thus under the current funding arrangement in England, it is unclear 
how much students would react to subject specific tuition fees. 
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Figure 3B: Estimated life cycle profiles for a subset of subjects – Females  
 
 
Note: Estimates based on gender specific OLS regression for graduates observed in LFS 1994-2010 
controlling for region of residence and year of interview 
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Table 1: A-level score (or equivalent) and institution quality by subject of study 










Medicine and Dentistry  28.11  2.36  38950  8632  331 
Sub. allied to Medicine  20.31  -0.09  24495  6534  762 
Biology, vet, agriculture  18.61  0.65  19993  6101  325 
Physical science  19.30  0.99  21364  6213  281 
Mathematics  24.16  1.78  24532  7755  177 
Engineering and Tech.  19.18  0.62  24602  7018  486 
Architecture and Planning  16.63  -0.09  23680  7068  147 
Social Studies  19.36  0.36  21614  6191  419 
Law  23.00  0.71  22880  8658  309 
Business and administration  16.09  -0.71  20976  6543  918 
Communication  16.43  -0.88  19876  5750  161 
Linguistic and Classics  22.13  1.14  19979  5588  202 
Language and literature  23.30  1.33  21711  5980  128 
History and Philosophy  22.06  1.45  20517  6398  226 
Creative Arts  15.53  -0.61  19293  6124  384 
Education  15.06  -0.36  22699  4433  253 
Other  17.34  -0.84  20069  5684  50 
Sport science  17.68  -0.89  20165  5333  100 
Psychology  20.29  0.12  19514  4649  245 
IT  16.56  -0.43  23036  7210  508 
Economics  24.23  1.58  25445  7832  110 
Finance & Accounting  18.23  -0.46  22782  8011  173 
Mixed no science  18.15  -0.16  22664  5230  374 
Mixed 45-55 science  19.62  0.13  22546  6211  566 
Mixed 100% science  21.67  1.42  22037  7191  100 
           
Total  19.50  0.26  22926  7760  7735 
Note: Source LDLHE 02/03. Sample restricted to individuals with positive value of the score. 
The score is obtained by taking the best three A-levels, grades A, B C, D and E are equivalent to 10, 8, 
6, 4, 2 points respectively.  – means for cells with less than 50 observations are not reported. 
 Table 2: OLS Estimates on the effect of subject of degree on annual earnings 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Medicine  0.611  0.613  0.578  0.523  0.508  0.502  0.490  0.490  0.429  0.413 
  [25.253]  [27.134]  [24.615]  [22.303]  [21.627]  [21.351]  [20.374]  [17.681]  [13.478]  [13.118] 
Subject allied to Medicine  0.137  0.14  0.148  0.151  0.151  0.157  0.147  0.153  0.114  0.100 
  [6.849]  [7.478]  [7.926]  [8.157]  [8.244]  [8.547]  [7.931]  [8.409]  [6.070]  [5.402] 
Biology, Veterinary  -0.064  -0.069  -0.061  -0.053  -0.052  -0.052  -0.043  -0.046  -0.061  -0.062 





                 
Mathematics  0.125  0.079  0.086  0.07  0.072  0.066  0.067  0.059  0.063  0.062 
  [4.917]  [3.298]  [3.608]  [2.981]  [3.084]  [2.820]  [2.908]  [2.545]  [2.958]  [2.945] 
Engineering and Techno.  0.142  0.126  0.107  0.119  0.119  0.118  0.096  0.110  0.077  0.077 
  [7.315]  [6.861]  [5.839]  [6.589]  [6.631]  [6.586]  [5.320]  [6.177]  [4.616]  [4.701] 
Architecture and Planning  0.113  0.118  0.105  0.130  0.134  0.139  0.131  0.124  0.111  0.092 
  [3.925]  [4.389]  [3.934]  [4.945]  [5.111]  [5.294]  [4.981]  [4.770]  [4.572]  [3.853] 
Social Studies  0.018  -0.01  0.004  0.010  0.007  0.008  0.012  0.012  0.027  0.022 
  [0.876]  [0.522]  [0.191]  [0.511]  [0.388]  [0.434]  [0.626]  [0.646]  [1.590]  [1.339] 
Law  0.091  0.037  0.056  0.043  0.042  0.044  0.039  0.048  0.048  0.031 
  [4.038]  [1.747]  [2.653]  [2.092]  [2.050]  [2.152]  [1.891]  [2.347]  [2.450]  [1.591] 
Business and Admin.  0.000  -0.023  -0.011  0.017  0.019  0.026  0.022  0.024  0.020  0.014 
  [0.006]  [1.392]  [0.681]  [1.004]  [1.142]  [1.609]  [1.313]  [1.497]  [1.347]  [0.941] 
Communication  -0.082  -0.114  -0.096  -0.083  -0.079  -0.065  -0.071  -0.069  -0.011  -0.015 
  [2.952]  [4.411]  [3.733]  [3.289]  [3.113]  [2.582]  [2.757]  [2.769]  [0.460]  [0.649] 
Linguistics and Classic  -0.075  -0.113  -0.097  -0.106  -0.105  -0.108  -0.097  -0.113  -0.085  -0.083 
  [3.158]  [5.071]  [4.387]  [4.843]  [4.827]  [4.976]  [4.440]  [5.284]  [4.270]  [4.236] 
Language and literature  0.052  -0.016  -0.025  -0.044  -0.047  -0.053  -0.055  -0.041  -0.029  -0.030 
  [1.936]  [0.656]  [1.011]  [1.785]  [1.925]  [2.161]  [2.276]  [1.689]  [1.281]  [1.360] 
History and Philosophy  -0.028  -0.073  -0.07  -0.079  -0.082  -0.083  -0.079  -0.087  -0.069  -0.062 
  [1.252]  [3.471]  [3.368]  [3.868]  [4.008]  [4.105]  [3.870]  [4.321]  [3.723]  [3.412] 
Creative arts  -0.113  -0.137  -0.12  -0.093  -0.092  -0.081  -0.091  -0.086  -0.044  -0.039 
  [5.758]  [7.465]  [6.593]  [5.153]  [5.083]  [4.461]  [4.829]  [4.773]  [2.578]  [2.319] 
Education  0.034  0.038  0.061  0.093  0.098  0.103  0.093  0.1  0.052  0.038 
  [1.259]  [1.508]  [2.437]  [3.736]  [3.979]  [4.161]  [3.705]  [4.096]  [2.293]  [1.697] 
                        Table continues on following page 
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Other subjects  -0.072  -0.029  -0.022  -0.011  0.005  0.013  0.004  0.009  -0.006  -0.006 
  [1.733]  [0.732]  [0.562]  [0.291]  [0.143]  [0.346]  [0.096]  [0.244]  [0.171]  [0.167] 
Sport sciences  -0.044  -0.018  -0.007  0.020  0.022  0.038  -0.005  0.036  0.026  0.033 
  [1.519]  [0.652]  [0.265]  [0.757]  [0.846]  [1.442]  [0.169]  [1.358]  [1.073]  [1.377] 
Psychology  -0.098  -0.094  -0.066  -0.077  -0.074  -0.068  -0.054  -0.080  -0.095  -0.093 
  [4.092]  [4.165]  [2.913]  [3.453]  [3.340]  [3.057]  [2.461]  [3.661]  [4.653]  [4.619] 
IT  0.050  0.038  0.040  0.060  0.065  0.070  0.067  0.066  0.037  0.041 
  [2.497]  [2.042]  [2.110]  [3.212]  [3.521]  [3.781]  [3.615]  [3.607]  [2.221]  [2.466] 
Economics  0.156  0.084  0.090  0.079  0.070  0.062  0.057  0.055  0.056  0.053 
  [5.236]  [3.003]  [3.252]  [2.895]  [2.588]  [2.293]  [2.122]  [2.042]  [2.278]  [2.166] 
Finance and Accounting  0.074  0.049  0.055  0.071  0.078  0.091  0.082  0.080  0.094  0.084 
  [2.546]  [1.768]  [2.008]  [2.629]  [2.905]  [3.418]  [3.076]  [3.042]  [3.809]  [3.461] 
Mixed no science  0.011  0.002  0.008  0.016  0.015  0.021  0.023  0.021  0.012  0.014 
  [0.463]  [0.108]  [0.357]  [0.770]  [0.702]  [1.025]  [1.092]  [1.034]  [0.647]  [0.757] 
Mixed 50% science  0.034  0.019  0.026  0.027  0.028  0.033  0.033  0.034  0.028  0.024 
  [1.713]  [1.032]  [1.431]  [1.472]  [1.560]  [1.838]  [1.799]  [1.908]  [1.701]  [1.459] 
Mixed 100% science  0.037  0.011  0.009  0.006  0.007  0.000  -0.021  0.000  -0.015  -0.033 
  [1.170]  [0.360]  [0.297]  [0.197]  [0.228]  [0.017]  [0.721]  [0.010]  [0.586]  [1.284] 
Local labour market    x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Personal characteristics
A      x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
A level score        x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Other background
B          x  x  x  x  x  x 
University quality            x    x  x  x 
Institution dummy              x       
Degree class                x  x  x 
Job characteristics
C                  x  x 
Reasons for current job
D                    x 
R
2  0.158  0.304  0.326  0.346  0.356  0.359  0.404  0.374  0.478  0.506 
Weighted sample of 7,735 observations. Controls for current location (postcode) included in all specifications.  T-statistics , clustered at the institution level in brackets.  
A: Gender, age, ethnicity and parental social class dummies 
B:Fee status, accommodation status, disability status, type of school attended 
C: Job tenure, permanent contract, employer size dummies, highest qualification dummies, number of jobs since graduating, month of unemployment since graduating 
and current occupation (2 digit SOC code) 
D:Reasons for accepted current job: career plan, job wanted, best offer, only offer, progress within firm, gain experience, access whether I like it, broaden skills, pay off 
debt, earn a living   27 
Table 3: Subject wage differential – by gender 
 









Coefficient on gender 
subject interaction   
(6) 
Coefficient on gender 
subject interaction – 
full model  (10) 
Medicine 
0.507  10.385    0.492  10.398  0.022  0.002 
  [17.512]      [12.221]    [0.51]  [0.048] 
Subject allied to Medicine  0.147  10.025    0.223  10.129  0.082  0.074 
  [6.713]      [5.751]    [2.03]  [2.024] 
Biology, Veterinary  -0.071  9.807    -0.04  9.866  0.062  0.006 
  [3.082]      [1.128]    [1.57]  [0.153] 
Physical science  
 
9.878      9.906  0.027  0.039 
 
 
        [1.00]  [1.589] 
Mathematics  0.048  9.926    0.069  9.975  -0.001  0.023 
  [1.590]      [1.870]    [0.02]  [0.564] 
Engineering and Techno.  0.069  9.947    0.115  10.021  0.052  0.001 
  [2.164]      [4.464]    [1.25]  [0.022] 
Architecture and Planning  0.117  9.995    0.119  10.025  -0.012  -0.015 
  [2.638]      [3.216]    [0.21]  [0.283] 
Social Studies  0.017  9.895    -0.018  9.888  0.007  0.003 
  [0.757]      [0.521]    [0.17]  [0.084] 
Law  0.003  9.881    0.113  10.019  0.117  0.084 
  [0.143]      [2.885]    [2.78]  [2.245] 
Business and Admin.  0.016  9.894    0.018  9.924  0.027  0.013 
  [0.773]      [0.683]    [0.83]  [0.460] 
Communication  -0.029  9.849    -0.142  9.764  -0.078  -0.075 
  [0.961]      [3.211]    [1.56]  [1.674] 
Linguistics and Classic  -0.075  9.803    -0.168  9.738  -0.139  -0.097   28 
  [3.019]      [3.573]    [2.91]  [2.245] 
Language and literature  -0.055  9.823    -0.012  9.894  0.041  0.029 
  [1.979]      [0.216]    [0.75]  [0.600] 
History and Philosophy  -0.036  9.842    -0.143  9.763  -0.090  -0.061 
  [1.375]      [4.243]    [2.24]  [1.688] 
Creative arts  -0.085  9.793    -0.098  9.808  0.026  0.056 
  [3.693]      [3.142]    [0.74]  [1.717] 
Education  0.158  10.036      -0.088  9.818  -0.215  -0.157 
  [5.826]      [1.502]    [3.76]  [3.035] 
Other subjects  0.014  9.892    0.043  9.949  0.036  0 
  [0.290]      [0.631]    [0.48]  [0.004] 
Sport sciences  0.086  9.964    -0.006  9.9  -0.059  0.007 
  [2.451]      [0.133]    [1.12]  [0.147] 
Psychology  -0.069  9.809    -0.062  9.844  0.036  0.024 
  [2.809]      [1.101]    [0.67]  [0.493] 
IT  0.017  9.895    0.099  10.005  0.087  0.076 
  [0.612]      [3.594]    [2.26]  [2.193] 
Economics  -0.053  9.825    0.116  10.022  0.167  0.116 
  [1.362]      [2.868]    [3.05]  [2.343] 
Finance and Accounting  0.112  9.99    0.087  9.993  -0.016  -0.033 
  [2.950]      [2.146]    [0.3]  [0.685] 
Mixed no science  0.082  9.96    -0.152  9.754  -0.206  -0.16 
  [3.342]      [3.729]    [4.68]  [4.048] 
Mixed 50% science  0.081  9.959    -0.034  9.872  -0.094  -0.085 
  [3.558]      [1.095]    [2.59]  [2.611] 
Mixed 100% science  0.03  9.908    -0.016  9.89  0.015  0.044 
 
[0.787]           [0.215]    [0.26]  [0.863] 
Note: Estimates based on specification (6) and (10) – see Table 2 for details.    29 
Table 4: Subject wage differential: Quantile regression  
 




Medicine  0.531  0.505  0.524  0.508  0.554  0.52  0.485  0.498  0.395  0.657 
  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.019]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.007]  [0.018]  [0.021]   
Subject allied to Medicine  0.162  0.203  0.208  0.169  0.172  0.137  0.096  0.115  0.079  0.681 
  [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.016]  [0.008]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.006]  [0.016]  [0.018]   
Biology, Veterinary  -0.1  -0.047  -0.01  -0.042  0.013  -0.027  -0.078  -0.041  -0.102  0.762 
  [0.010]  [0.007]  [0.019]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.014]  [0.007]  [0.020]  [0.023]   
Physics  (base category) 
                 
0.764 
Mathematics  0.137  0.077  0.106  0.041  0.067  0.04  0.015  0.103  0.174  0.801 
  [0.012]  [0.009]  [0.024]  [0.012]  [0.016]  [0.016]  [0.008]  [0.023]  [0.026]   
Engineering and Techno.  0.115  0.15  0.142  0.104  0.136  0.101  0.077  0.113  0.063  0.712 
  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.018]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.006]  [0.018]  [0.020]   
Architecture and Planning  0.111  0.131  0.139  0.073  0.092  0.102  0.085  0.164  0.137  0.79 
  [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.026]  [0.014]  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.009]  [0.026]  [0.029]   
Social Studies  0.036  0.035  0.067  0.021  0.05  0.019  -0.022  0.001  -0.019  0.709 
  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.019]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.007]  [0.019]  [0.022]   
Law  0.063  0.036  0.062  0.032  0.048  0.059  0.065  0.149  0.094  0.795 
  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.020]  [0.011]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.007]  [0.020]  [0.024]   
Business and Admin.  0.012  0.014  0.042  -0.001  0.049  0.045  0.021  0.042  0.038  0.79 
  [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.016]  [0.009]  [0.011]  [0.012]  [0.006]  [0.017]  [0.019]   
Communication  -0.057  0.055  0.059  0.004  0.002  -0.016  -0.086  -0.095  -0.175  0.652 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.024]  [0.013]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.009]  [0.022]  [0.024]   
Linguistics and Classic  -0.026  -0.021  -0.01  -0.074  -0.059  -0.056  -0.091  -0.075  -0.188  0.641 
  [0.012]  [0.008]  [0.022]  [0.012]  [0.015]  [0.016]  [0.008]  [0.021]  [0.020]   
Language and literature  -0.021  0.01  0.02  0.001  0.043  0.024  -0.008  -0.029  -0.102  0.693 
  [0.013]  [0.009]  [0.025]  [0.014]  [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.009]  [0.024]  [0.027]     30 
History and Philosophy  -0.093  -0.056  -0.013  -0.042  -0.037  -0.082  -0.097  -0.037  -0.07  0.787 
  [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.020]  [0.011]  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.007]  [0.021]  [0.025]   
Creative arts  -0.105  -0.081  -0.061  -0.088  -0.061  -0.072  -0.071  -0.035  -0.072  0.797 
  [0.010]  [0.007]  [0.018]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.007]  [0.019]  [0.021]   
Education  0.14  0.146  0.145  0.137  0.167  0.124  0.094  0.08  -0.023  0.634 
  [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.023]  [0.012]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.007]  [0.020]  [0.021]   
Other subjects  0.025  -0.013  0.046  0.048  0.047  0.015  -0.081  -0.077  -0.191  0.588 
  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.033]  [0.019]  [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.012]  [0.031]  [0.033]   
Sport sciences  -0.042  0.108  0.057  0.029  0.067  0.007  -0.044  0.002  -0.079  0.734 
  [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.027]  [0.015]  [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.009]  [0.028]  [0.033]   
Psychology  -0.003  -0.027  -0.006  -0.05  -0.015  -0.075  -0.091  -0.069  -0.143  0.624 
  [0.010]  [0.008]  [0.021]  [0.011]  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.007]  [0.021]  [0.023]   
IT  0.014  0.032  0.064  0.074  0.074  0.08  0.024  0.055  0.066  0.816 
  [0.009]  [0.007]  [0.018]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.006]  [0.018]  [0.021]   
Economics  0.102  0.093  0.159  0.075  0.145  0.089  0.025  0.131  0.132  0.794 
  [0.012]  [0.010]  [0.027]  [0.014]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.009]  [0.029]  [0.022]   
Finance and Accounting  0.07  0.05  0.095  0.019  0.032  0.073  0.09  0.222  0.28  0.974 
  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.025]  [0.013]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.009]  [0.026]  [0.032]   
Mixed no science  -0.074  0.013  0.108  0.083  0.1  0.07  0.028  0.025  -0.032  0.806 
  [0.011]  [0.008]  [0.020]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.007]  [0.018]  [0.021]   
Mixed 50% science  0.001  0.013  0.07  0.052  0.094  0.098  0.067  0.09  0.01  0.779 
  [0.010]  [0.007]  [0.018]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.013]  [0.006]  [0.018]  [0.021]   
Mixed 100% science  0.022  0.039  0.071  0.044  0.065  0.015  0.015  0.007  -0.147  0.675 
 
[0.014]  [0.010]  [0.028]  [0.014]  [0.019]  [0.019]  [0.009]  [0.023]  [0.024]   
The analysis is conducted on the weighted sample of 7,735 observations and controls for age, gender, ethnicity, disability status, A-level score, parental social class, type of school, fee status, 
class of degree and institution quality.  Standard errors reported in brackets. Table 5: Graduate tax and implicit tuition fees  
 
  Implied annual tuition fee 
Parameters:       
25 years 
9% over £15,000 
 
Men  Women  All 
Management graduate  4,800  1,200  3,300 
Graduate earning 10% 
less through out 
3,300  100  1,900 
Graduate earning 5% 
less through out 
4,100  600  2,600 
Graduate earning 5% 
more through out 
5,600  1,800  3,900 
Graduate earning 10% 
more through out 
6,300  2,300  4,600 
Graduate earning 15% 
more through out 
7,100  2,900  5,300 
       
10th earning percentile  0  0  0 
25
th earning percentile  600  0  0 
Median graduate  2,300  1,400  2,000 
75
th earning percentile  6,900  3,400  5,300 
90
th earning percentile  11,900  6,700  9,600 
 
30 years 
9% over £21,000 
     
       
Management graduate  3,500  0  1,800 
Graduate earning 10% less 
through out 
2,000  0  400 
Graduate earning 5% less 
through out 
2,700  0  1,100 
Graduate earning 5% more 
through out 
4,300  0  2,600 
Graduate earning 10% more 
through out 
5,200  600  3,300 
Graduate earning 15% more 
through out 
6,000  1,200  4,000 
       
10th earning percentile  0  0  0 
25th earning percentile  0  0  0 
Median graduate  500  0  200 
75th earning percentile  5,600  1,500  3,800 
90th earning percentile  11,600  5,300  8,900 
Note: Calculations based on the earning profile of graduates in the LFS (1994-2010). The profile is based 
on the average earnings in 5 years age group, and assuming linear growth over each 5 years period. The 
graduate tax is paid on growth income above £15,000 at a rate of 9% as currently set up by the Student 
Loan Company. Implicit fees are calculated as the present value of total graduate tax over the payment 
period minus £11,000 (which represents the part of a loan due to maintenance, on average) divided by the 
typical length of a degree.  The flow of tax payment is discounted at the HM treasury recommended 
discount rate of 3.5% back to age 18 when students make their decision to enter higher education.  
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Appendix: 
Table A1: Sample Selection: 
Selection criteria  –  applied 
incrementally  Number of observations 
Original sample  19,979 
First degree only  11,866 
Age on graduation [18,25]  9,850 
Not special entry student  9,738 
Employed FT or PT  9,296 
With valid wages  8,239 
Working full time  7,735 
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Table A2: Comparing HESA and LDLHE populations 
  HESA 2002/03  LDLHE   LDLHE – 
valid wage 
Subject of study  Freq.  Percent  Freq in %.  Freq in %. 
Medicine and Dentistry  7,475  1.81  3.00  3.06 
Sub. allied to Medicine  42,956  10.41  6.59  6.33 
Biology, vet, agriculture  16,886  4.09  4.91  5.16 
Physical science  15,069  3.65  4.63  4.88 
Mathematics  5,919  1.43  2.43  2,58 
Engineering and Tech.  24,094  5.84  6.81  7.18 
Architecture and Planning  9,082  2.20  1.83  1.84 
Social Studies  25,322  6.14  5.70  5.66 
Law  16,600  4.02  3.92  3.93 
Business and administration  50,979  12.36  11.84  11.93 
Communication  8,781  2.13  2.18  2.05 
Linguistic and Classics  11,310  2.74  3.40  3.25 
Language and literature  6,590  1.60  2.30  2.24 
History and Philosophy  13,787  3.34  4.15  4.06 
Creative Arts  30,196  7.32  7.71  6.95 
Education  37,824  9.17  2.16  2.17 
Other  14,034  3.40  0.70  0.74 
Sport science  3,462  0.84  1.62  1.82 
Psychology  10,320  2.50  3.23  3.13 
IT  23,109  5.60  6.26  6.24 
Economics  5,285  1.28  1.64  1.65 
Finance & Accounting  5,731  1.39  1.76  1.75 
Mixed no science  8,260  2.00  3.62  3.68 
Mixed 45-55 science  15,420  3.74  6.27  6.30 
Mixed 100% science  4,088  0.99  1.35  1.43 
Total  412,79  100.00  9,296  7.735 
Note: HESA 2002/03 is the sample of eligible DLHE students only.  
9,296 is the sample of first degree holder, aged [18,25] without special entry and currently 
working full-time or part-time. 
7.735 is the sample of full-time respondent with valid wage information. 
 